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Abstract 
 
Investor confidence regarding the reliability of financial statements is absolutely critical for 
publicly traded companies. The bankruptcy of Enron has brought to the forefront the issue of 
auditor independence and financial statement reliability. As a response to the criticism that the 
growth in consulting services by CPA firms was leading to a conflict of interest and significantly 
hindering auditor independence, the SEC approved new auditor independence regulations that 
required publicly traded firms to disclose the level of fees that were paid to their external auditor 
for non-audit services.   
 
This paper investigates the impact that the Enron collapse has had on investor perceptions about 
auditor independence and financial statement reliability. Using data from proxy statements 
concerning non-audit fees paid to external auditors, we find evidence that auditor independence 
and therefore financial statement reliability are compromised by the provision of these non-audit 
services. The results indicate that in the wake of the Enron revelations, investors perceive 
financial statements as being less reliable and thus require an additional risk premium, which 
translates into lower stock prices and a loss of firm value. We also find that there is negative 
relationship between the extent to which firms use non-audit services and the negative abnormal 
returns they suffered during the Enron collapse. 
 
 
1.0  Introduction 
 
n November 2000, the SEC approved new auditor independence regulations that required publicly traded 
firms to disclose the level of fees that were paid to their external auditor for non-audit services. This 
requirement was part of a response to the criticism that the growth in consulting services by CPA firms was 
leading to a conflict of interest and significantly hindering auditor independence.  
 
The bankruptcy of Enron and the significant extent to which its auditor-Arthur Andersen- provided 
consulting and internal auditing services has brought to the forefront the issue of auditor independence and financial 
statement reliability. Investor confidence regarding the reliability of financial statements is absolutely critical for 
publicly traded companies and the impact that the Enron bankruptcy and the role of its auditor have had on the 
perception of financial statement users is an issue of significant importance that can be empirically examined. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the reaction of the stock market to the disclosure of non-audit fees 
in the wake of the Enron collapse. The study will examine whether the disclosure of non-audit fees and their 
proportion to regular audit fees provides information to the market and results in changes in firm value. By 
examining the behavior of stock prices around the time that the Enron accounting irregularities took prominent place 
in the news, we can make inferences regarding the information content of the non-audit fee disclosures and its 
impact on investor perceptions about auditor independence and financial statement reliability. 
___________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
I 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the background of the SEC‟s auditor 
independence rule and develops our hypothesis. Section III describes the data and methodology we use. Section IV 
presents the empirical results. Section V concludes the paper.  
 
2.0  Background And Hypothesis 
 
The collapse of Enron Corp. is one of the most significant business failures of our time. The failure of the 
nation‟s fifth largest corporation and the tangled web that precipitated its collapse has dominated the headlines. The 
series of unsettling revelations coming from the Enron case seemingly have led investors to look skeptically at 
balance sheets across the economy. The Enron failure has called into question the creation and analysis of financial 
statements. Considering that financial statements are the foundations upon which the American investment culture 
has been built, finding cracks in this structure has the potential to undermine trust in the markets (Tannenbaum, 
2002) 
 
The importance of auditor independence has been a widely recognized issue by regulators and researchers 
(Lowe 1999; De Angelo 1981) Auditors facilitate the relationship between investors and management by assuring 
the reliability of financial statements. However, this relationship is built on the assumption auditor independence 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Auditor independence can be defined in the context of the overall audit quality 
along with the likelihood that the auditor will discover and report problems with the accounting reporting 
(DeAngelo, 1981). 
  
The debate about auditor independence and financial statement reliability has carried renewed force as the 
revelations following auditing irregularities for Enron Corp. have become widely known. At the center of the debate 
are the efforts of auditing firms to seek alternative sources of revenue by offering various types of professional 
services including internal audit, risk management, and a variety of consulting services (Swanger, 2001). This has 
resulted in accounting firms aggressively looking to consulting services as a way to maintain growth in the face of 
stagnant fee revenue from their traditional services (Lowe et al, 1999, Elliot and Pallais, 1997). CPA firms have 
been largely successful in this pursuit as seen by the dramatic increase in the proportion of fee revenues from non-
audit services they have earned. From 1993 to 1999, the average annual growth rate from revenues from 
management advisory services was 26 percent compared to 9 for audit services. In a recent study, Frankel et al, 
(2002) examine over 4000 publicly traded companies and find that that non-audit fee comprise approximately 70% 
of total fee revenue and 96% of the clients purchase non-audit services.  
 
The SEC, concerned over the rapid growth of non-audit services by external auditors has responded with 
Rule S7-13-00, Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements. In the view of the SEC, a 
potential conflict arises from what the agency calls a “mutuality of interest” between auditor and client (Levitt, 
1996). The intent of the new SEC requirement has been to show external auditors as independent in fact as well as 
independent in appearance given the need for the public to maintain its confidence on the reliability of the audited 
financial statements (Hussey, 2001).  
 
The new rule now requires a proxy statement disclosing the total fees paid to the external auditor. These 
fees are to be broken into three parts:  
 
 Fees for audit of annual financial statements and quarterly review,  
 Fees for financial information systems design and implementation; and  
 All other fees such as internal auditing and consulting.  
 
Furthermore, the firm‟s audit committee must now indicate in the proxy whether it considered the impact of the non-
audit services on its auditor‟s independence.  
 
In summary, to the extent that the perception of auditor independence is as important as the actuality of 
independence (Schutze, 1994), part of the rationale behind the new rule appears to be to let investors decide whether 
the other services provided by the auditor are the “tail wagging the auditing parent dog” (Barlas, 2001). 
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3.0  Non-Audit Services And Auditor Independence 
 
 The assurance of financial statement reliability rests to a great degree on the assumption of auditor 
independence. Therefore, the impact that the provision of non-audit services by the external auditor has on the 
perception of auditor independence is critical in determining how investors perceive the financial statements of 
public companies. This impact can be seen in two different perspectives. 
 
3.1  The View Against Auditors Providing Non-Audit Services 
 
Essentially, critics of the increased non-audit activity by auditing firms contend that providing all of these 
additional services threatens auditor independence (Swanger, 2001). To the extent that these additional services 
represent significant cash flows, the argument is made that these future “quasi-rent” constitute an economic bond 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Simunic, 1984). If this is the case, auditors with an economic interest in their clients may be less 
likely to report breaches in the accounting system (DeAngelo, 1981). That is, external auditors may be inclined to 
serve the interests of the management team rather than the interest of shareholders and investors (Cheney, 1996). 
 
There is a significant amount of literature that finds a negative impact when auditors provide management 
advisory services to their clients. Swanger (2001) found that the provision of consulting services by the external 
auditor creates a business relationship with increased fees, makes the client more valuable to the auditor and 
possibly clouds the auditor‟s judgment for fear of losing the client. A number of other studies also find that financial 
statement users believe independence to be compromised if the external auditor performs consulting services for the 
audit client (Pany and Reckers, 1983, 1984; Reckers and Stagliano 1981, Shockley, 1981). Gul (1991) notes that 
when fees are a significant proportion of the auditors‟ total revenue, third party perceptions of the auditor‟s ability to 
withstand management power is adversely affected suggesting a link between reputation and perceived 
independence.  
 
In the context of investor perceptions, some studies have found that financial statement users perceive the 
highest degree of independence in an audit when the consulting and audit personnel were separate as opposed when 
they were combined (Lowe and Pany, 1995, 1996; Pany and Reckers, 1984). A more recent study suggests that 
companies with a high ratio of non-audit fees to total fees are more likely to meet or beat the earnings benchmarks-
analysts expectations. That is, firms with less independent auditors appear to manage their earnings more than firms 
that have a low ratio of non-audit fees to total fees (Frankel, Johnson, Nelson, 2002). 
 
Finally, regulatory authorities and professional boards have also weighted-in arguing against dual work.  
The Public Oversight Board (POB) of the American Institute of certified Public Accountants notes that the provision 
of non-audit services results in lower audit quality and increased likelihood that the auditor will waive earnings 
management attempts (Frankel, 2002). 
 
3.2  The View In Favor Of Auditors Providing Non-Audit Services 
 
 The other perspective on the auditor independence debate holds that providing non-audit services does not 
compromise independence but actually reinforces it. A number of studies find that in performing consulting 
services, auditor independence is not significantly affected  (Pany and Reckers, 1983, McKinley et al, 1985). 
Arrunada (1999) modeled the non-audit services impact on audit quality and concluded that the dual function 
complements the audit function and increases the audit‟s firm reputation. That is, economic interest would be at risk 
if the firm compromised its independence since any benefit from unethical conduct would be small compared to the 
potential loss of the quasi-rents from many clients (Lowe et al, 1999).  De Angelo (1981) noted that that the 
potential penalty to the reputation of the firm constraints the behavior of the auditor.  
 
Institutional factors may also play a significant role in supporting the favorable view on the provision non-
audit services. The enhanced potential legal liability carried by CPA firms that also perform consulting or internal 
audits for their external audit clients may enhance their perceived objectivity and independence (AICPA 1997). 
Auditors face large legal sanctions from poor quality audits. Aggregate claims against the big firms reached $30 
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billion in 1992 (Frankel, 2002). Ahlawat (1998) found that due to concerns over malpractice litigation, outsourced 
external auditors were actually more objective than in-house internal auditors. 
 
Lowe et al (1999) examined the impact that the outsourcing of the internal audit has on financial statement 
user‟s perceptions of auditor independence. The results of his study suggest that outsourcing the internal audit does 
not, in itself, negatively affect perceptions of auditor independence. Moreover the implementation of separate teams 
to carry out the internal and external audit functions may strengthen public confidence that the external audit 
function is not influenced by other relationships (Sullivan, 1995). 
 
Finally, the AICPA position has been that increased economic interest by the external auditor may actually 
reinforce the independence between auditor and clients (AICPA 1997). That is, the AICPA‟s view is that as long as 
the responsibility of the internal audit function remains with management and the auditor does not take on 
operational responsibilities, there is no conflict of interest. This view if further amplified by the AICPA hypothesis 
that internal audit functions may actually provide external auditors with greater understanding of the firm and thus 
better prepare them to discover errors or fraud (Carmichael, 1998).  
 
4.0  Firm Value Effect And Hypothesis 
 
The net equity price reaction to non-audit fee proxy disclosure can only be assessed empirically. The new 
SEC regulation on auditor independence represents a significant rule that allows us to examine the impact of 
mandatory audit fee disclosure in providing a clearer picture of auditor independence and thus financial statement 
reliability. Enhanced disclosure levels of auditor activities can be either beneficial or detrimental to auditor 
independence and therefore carry important implications about the perceptions of financial statement users.   
 
A negative market reaction would imply that investors regard the company as being less reliable by having 
auditors that are not completely independent. The result of this reaction is that investors reduce their expectations of 
the future CF‟s or interpret the high fees as signaling poor management quality or some undisclosed difficulty with 
the company (Frankel, et al 2002). If investors perceive the financial statements to have a higher probability to be 
unreliable, then they will require a additional risk premium, which would translate into, lower stock prices and loss 
of firm value- (Simunic, 1984). Moreover, a perception of lower audit quality may result in lower stock prices as 
investors revise downwards the firm‟s earnings‟ stream (Teoh and Wong, 1993). 
 
Furthermore, the collapse of Enron, because of its magnitude, the enormous amount of coverage that it 
received and the focus that was placed on its auditor, represents a unique opportunity to measure investors‟ 
perception to auditor independence and financial statement reliability in the context of the new proxy disclosures. 
 
This study posits that the new mandatory reporting requirements under the new SEC rule provide 
meaningful information about auditor independence and therefore affect stock prices. The greater information 
disclosure suggests an enhanced picture of the firm and motivates the following null hypothesis: 
 
H1:       The new SEC rules providing disclosure of non-audit fees paid to the external auditor have had no impact 
on stock prices in the context of the Enron accounting irregularities. 
 
5.0  Data And Methodology 
 
The study will examine whether the new SEC rule requiring the disclosure of non-audit fees paid to 
external auditors provides information to the market by examining the stock price reaction to these disclosures in the 
wake of the Enron collapse. The new SEC rule requires that registrants disclose the non-audit services the auditor 
provided on their proxy statements filed after February 5 2001.  
 
Patel (1979) posits that from an investor‟s perspective, information is any data whose disclosure will alter 
the probability distribution over future states of the utility derived from holding a portion of the firm‟s debt or 
equity. To the extent that the new SEC rule on non-audit fee disclosure provides a more meaningful picture of 
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auditor independence and therefore a clearer picture of financial statement accuracy, such probability distribution 
will differ from a distribution that is free of this disclosure. 
 
Given that the utility probability distribution of an investor is unobservable, it follows that we are left with 
an operational technique (events study methodology) in which we analyze stock returns and test for significant 
changes in them that can‟t be explained by other events. This leads us to infer that the presence of abnormal returns 
during the event period is due to the non-audit fees disclosures. 
 
Frankel et al (2002) showed in a study that reviewed over 4000 proxies that a relatively small number of 
clients –essentially the largest corporations-account for a disproportionate amount of each of the Big Five‟s non-
audit fee revenue. Thus, our study focuses on these large corporations. Our initial sample consists of the top 150 
U.S. firms as listed by the 2002 Fortune 500 (America‟s largest corporations) ranking. In order to be included in our 
sample, firms have to have a definitive proxy statement filed between February 5, 2001 and September 1, 2001 in 
the EDGAR database. Also, firms were not chosen if they had changed auditors during the year. The final sample 
size given these restrictions was 115 firms. Because of their size and market values, firms included in this list 
receive substantial scrutiny and are closely followed by a significant number of analysts.   
 
All 115 of the firms sampled reported fees for non-audit services, on average these fees amounted to nearly 
$16 million and represented about 69% of a firm‟s total fees. Panel A of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the 
different fees disclosed by the proxies. 
 
 
TABLE 1:  Descriptive Statistics of Auditor Fees and CONSULTRATIO Disclosed in the Proxy Statements 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of auditor fees and CONSULTRATIO disclosed in the Proxy Statements.  The sample 
includes 115 companies that filed a definitive proxy statement between February 5, 2001 and September 1, 2001 in the EDGAR 
database and were listed as 150 largest American corporations by Fortune. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of auditor 
fees. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics of variable CONSULTRATIO. Average is the mean of estimated coefficients of 
dummy variables. Std is the standard deviation of estimated coefficients of dummy variables. Max is the maximum value of 
variables. Min is the minimum value of variables. % of Total Fees is the ratio of each fee on the total fees. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Auditor Fees 
 
Variables Average Std % of Total Fees 
Auditor Fees $5.101 $5.328 24% 
IS Fees $2.779 $8.814 13% 
Other Fees $13.217 $17.044 63% 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of CONSULTRATIO 
 
Variables Average Std Max Min 
CONSULTRATIO 68.8% 15.8% 94.2% 22% 
 
 
Panel B of Table 1 provides summary statistics on the extent to which the firms‟ non-audit fees compare to 
their total fees paid. This ratio, which is the ratio of all non-audit services (IS Fees plus Other Fees) to the total fees 
paid by the corporation to its external auditor, serves as a proxy for auditor independence and is called 
CONSULTRATIO.  
 
The events related to the Enron accounting scandal are identified from the Wall Street Journal Index and 
the Wall Street Journal. In this study, we consider two critical events: the initial disclosure of accounting 
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irregularities with Enron and the investigation of Arthur Andersen by the SEC. Event 1 is considered a significant 
event as it is the watershed announcement concerning Enron‟s accounting problems and brings to the forefront 
issues regarding auditor effectiveness. This event represents the announcement by the firm that its financial 
statements were inaccurate and led to a restatement involving a $1.2 billion equity write-off that was a front-page 
story in the Wall Street Journal and provided investors with the beginning point of the Enron saga. Event 2 
represents the announcement of the SEC‟s formal investigation of Arthur Andersen. This event is significant for it 
represents another critical point in the debate about auditor independence. As revelations about the role that 
Andersen played in providing consulting services to Enron were systematically disclosed, this date marks an 
identifiable point in investor skepticism towards auditor independence. Table 2 briefly illustrates the two events 
studied.  
 
 
TABLE 2:  Events Relating to Enron Accounting Scandal 
 
Event Disclosure Date by WSJ Brief Description 
1 October 17 2001 
Accounting irregularities with Enron were disclosed-$1.2 billion equity 
write-off was undertaken 
2 November 29 2001 Arthur Andersen was put under investigation by SEC 
 
 
 The paper uses daily stock return data from the CRSP tape from January 2 2001 to December 31 2001. To 
test the robustness of our results, we choose two market benchmark indices from the CRSP tape: CRSP value-
weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Index and the S&P 500 Index.  
 
There are two different statistical approaches to test the impact of certain events on the security prices. One 
is the FFJR model proposed by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) that analyzes the cumulative abnormal returns 
and average abnormal returns. This approach first computes the market model from an estimation period in order to 
calculate the predicted normal returns. The method then calculates the abnormal returns for the sample firms by 
subtracting their actual returns from the predicted normal returns during the event window.  
 
The alternative methodology is Multivariate Regression Model (MVRM) first suggested by Gibbons 
(1980). The MVRM adds a zero-one dummy variables for multiple events into the market model, so it is popular in 
research testing the significance of different events on security prices. The estimated coefficient of the dummy 
variable represents the effect of a specific event on the security prices. In this study, we use this dummy variable 
approach. The regression model is the following: 
 
(1)                                        it
E
e
etieMtiit uDiRR  
1
  
where: 
 
 Rit =  the daily returns of the stock i on day t; 
 RMt =  the daily return of S&P 500 Index or CRSP value-weighted NYSE and  AMEX/NASDAQ Index on day t; 
ie  =  the effect of the eth event on the price of stock i;   
Det =  dummy variables that equal one during the three-day event window (the disclosure date by WSJ and before       
and after one trading day) and zero otherwise; 
 E = number of events studied (equal to two in this study). 
 
Following Espahbodi et al (1995), we set the dummy variables to one during the disclosure date by WSJ as 
well as one trading day before and after, and to zero otherwise. The purpose of selecting three-day event window is 
to account for the unknown exact timing of information release. The model is estimated over the period from 
January 2, 2001 to December 31, 2001. 
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When we assume that the coefficients in the equation (1) are different for each company, we have the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression model (SUR). Following Greene (2000), the FGLS regression is used to account 
for the unknown covariance matrix of the disturbance. As the first step of FGLS regression, we obtain the OLS 
residuals to estimate the consistent cross-sectional covariance matrix. 
 
The first null hypothesis is that the average abnormal return during each of event period equals zero: 
 
(2)                                                        0H :     0ie  
 
 where i is the number of companies in the sample, and e is the eth events in the study. 0H is similar to the analysis 
of average abnormal return in Fama et al‟s model. Besides, we consider two joint linear hypotheses: 
 
(3)                                                   :1H     0ie   ei,  
 
(4)                                                    :2H     0ie   i  
 
where i is the number of companies in the sample, and e is the eth events in the study. 1H  tests whether both events 
have a significant impact on the stock prices, while 2H  tests the impact from only one of the events. Binder (1985) 
argued that the main advantage of MVRM over Fama et al‟s market model approach is that MVRM can easily 
handle the joint linear hypothesis test because MVRM explicitly incorporate cross-sectional correlations in the 
parameter estimation and hypothesis testing.  
 
Our study will also measure the impact on firm value of the non-audit service fees disclosure by focusing 
on the magnitude of these fees compared to the total audit feed paid by each firm. In order to do this, a proxy for the 
extent to which the firm engages its auditors for non-audit services is computed. This proxy is the ratio of non-audit 
fees (the sum of IS and other fees) to total audit fees and we call it CONSULTRATIO. The ratio of these two fees has 
been used as a proxy for auditor independence before (Firth 1997, Barkness and Simnett 1994).  
 
Given that we posit that stock prices will react to the information disclosure, we use the CONSULTRATIO 
variable as a proxy for the degree to which the market views auditors as being independent and thus views the 
financial statements as being reliable. We test the impact that the level of non-audit fees has had on the abnormal 
returns by estimating the following regression: 
 
(5)                                   eeee IOCONSULTRATD   )(*  
 
where:  
 
   De = estimated coefficient of the dummy variable (abnormal returns) from equation (1) 
  CONSULTRATIO = the ratio of all non-audit services (IS fees plus Other fees) to the total fees paid by the firm to 
its external auditor 
 
The estimate of e represents the effect of non-audit fees on investor reaction to each of the events. To the 
extent that the market views high levels of non-audit fees as hindering auditor independence and financial statement 
reliability, we would expect the estimate of e to be negative
i
.  
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6.0  Results 
 
Table 3 presents the excess returns resulting from equation (1) for the period from January 2 2001 to 
December 31 2001. The estimated coefficients of the dummy variables measure the impact on the stock prices of 
different events associated with the Enron revelations. Panel A and B use the CRSP value-weighted 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index and SP500 Index respectively. The results indicate the presence of significant 
negative abnormal returns from Event 1, e.g. the average abnormal return is -0.00274 when compared to the CRSP 
value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Index with significance at the level of 1%. The average abnormal return is 
-0.00249 when compared to the S&P500 Index with significance at the level of 5%.  
 
On the other hand, the results show that Event 2 has a relatively smaller impact on firm value: the average 
abnormal return is only significantly different from zero at the 10% level when compared to the CRSP value-
weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Index.  
 
As Panel C of Table 3 shows, the F-statistics of the estimated coefficients for dummy variables reject the 
null hypothesis that all the abnormal returns from all events are not significantly different from zero. Panel D reports 
the testing results of null hypothesis 2H . The F statistics show that the abnormal returns from either of two events 
are significantly different from zero at the level of 1%.  These findings suggest the presence of significantly negative 
abnormal returns accompanying the announcement of Enron accounting irregularities. The results provide evidence 
consistent with the argument that investors reduced their valuations as a compensation for the perceived reduction in 
audit quality. These results may also indicate negative perceptions by investors concerning the quality of the 
expected future cash flows.   
 
 
TABLE 3:  Estimation of Dummy Variables in MVRM/SUR Model 
 
Summary statistics for the estimation of dummy variables in the MVRM/SUR model from January 2 2001 to December 31 2001. 
There are total 115 companies and 248 trading days. Panel A uses the CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Index as 
market benchmark. Panel B uses the SP500 Index as market benchmark. Event 1 and 2 are the events described in Table 2. 
Average is the mean of estimated coefficients of dummy variables. Std is the standard deviation of estimated coefficients of 
dummy variables. Max is the maximum value of estimated coefficients of dummy variables. Min is the minimum value of 
estimated coefficients of dummy variables. Median is the median value of estimated coefficients of dummy variables. t-statistics 
of mean of the estimated coefficients of the dummy variables is in the parenthesis. Panel C and D report the test of the two jointly 
linear hypothesis of 1H and 2H . 
 
 
Panel A: CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Index as market benchmark 
Event Average Std Max Min Median 
1 -0.00274 0.012485 0.028746 -0.06004 -0.00183 
 (-2.355)***     
2 -0.0017 0.013338 0.027732 -0.0909 0.000194 
 (-1.365)*     
  
 
Panel B: SP500 Index as market benchmark 
 
Event Average Std Max Min Median 
1 -0.00249 0.012517 0.029066 -0.05973 -0.00165 
 (-2.135)**     
2 -0.00134 0.013332 0.028472 -0.09055 0.000659 
 (-1.080)     
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Panel C: Test of jointly linear hypotheses of 1H  
 
 CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Index SP500 Index 
F statistic 1.86 1.85 
p-value 0.0001 0.0001 
 
 
Panel D: Test of jointly linear hypotheses of 2H  
 
Event  CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Index SP500 Index 
1 F statistic 1.97 1.95 
 p-value 0.0001 0.0001 
2 F statistic 1.75 1.74 
 p-value 0.0001 0.0001 
*** Significant at the 1% level based on a one-tailed t-test 
** Significant at the 5% level based on a one-tailed t-test 
*   Significant at the 10% level based on a one-tailed t-test 
 
Table 4 below shows the results for the regression between the abnormal returns and the ratio of consulting 
fees to total audit fees. The dependent variable is the dummy variable coefficients of different events, while the 
independent variable is the firm characteristic reflecting the independence and accuracy of financial statements –the 
ratio of non-audit fees over total fees paid to external auditors. Panel A reports the OLS regression of equation (5). 
Generally, the relationship between the coefficients of dummy variables and the ratio of non-auditing fee is negative 
for Event 1 with significance at the level of 5%. But the same relationship for Event 2 is not significantly different 
from zero. These finding are consistent with the results found in the Table 4 where Event 2 has smaller abnormal 
returns than Event 1. Panel B shows that there is no evidence of significant positive and negative AR (1) and AR (2) 
autocorrelation among OLS residues. And Panel C indicates that OLS residues for Event 1 and 2 have few sign of 
heteroscedasticity. But we still report the t-statistics adjusted by heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors in Panel 
A. 
  
Overall, Table 4 shows strong evidence that the abnormal returns of Event 1 are negatively related with the 
ratio of non-audit fee. This result suggests that investors reassessed their perceptions of auditor independence and 
financial statement reliability when the first big shock news from Enron took place. The subsequent official 
investigation of Arthur Andersen by the SEC has no impact on firm values. That is, the influence of Event 2 on the 
level of abnormal returns is minimal and we posit can be understood in the context of “old” news from the 
perspective of investors.  
 
 
TABLE 4:  Parameter Estimates for the Regression between Abnormal Returns And Consulting Fee Ratio 
 
Panel A reports the OLS estimation of equation (5): 
 
eeee IOCONSULTRATD   )(*  
 
Where eD is the estimated coefficient of dummy variable from equation (3), CONSULTRATIO is the ratio of all non-audit 
services (IS Fees plus Other Fees) to the total fees paid by the corporation to its external auditor. Panel B reports the Generalized 
Durbin-Watson statistics of autocorrelation for OLS residues for Event 1 and 2 compared to CRSP value-weighted 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Index and SP500 Index. Panel C reports the results of White tests for heteroscedasticity of OLS residue 
for Event 1 and 2 compared to CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Index and SP500 Index. t-statistics calculated by 
the heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in the parenthesis. 
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Panel A: OLS regression of dummy against ratio of non-audit fee 
 
 CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Index SP500 Index 
 e=1(Event 1) e=2(Event 2) e=1(Event 1) e=2(Event 2) 
e  0.00893 0.00147 0.00916 0.00187 
e  -0.01698 -0.00461 -0.01694 -0.00467 
 (-2.34)** (-0.64) (-2.32)** (-0.65) 
2R  0.0467 0.0030 0.0462 0.0031 
***: Significant at the 1% level based on a two-tailed t-test 
**:   Significant at the 5% level based on a two-tailed t-test 
*:    Significant at the 10% level based on a two-tailed t-test 
 
 
Panel B: Generalized Durbin-Watson test for AR (1) and AR (2) autocorrelation of OLS residues 
 
  CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Index SP500 Index 
 Order DW 
Positive 
Autocorrelation P 
value 
Negative 
Autocorrelation P 
value 
DW 
Positive 
Autocorrelation  
P value 
Negative 
Autocorrelation 
P value 
Event 1 
1 2.0314 0.5638 0.4362 2.0295 0.5596 0.4404 
2 1.9092 0.3432 0.6568 1.9086 0.342 0.658 
Event 2 
1 1.8468 0.2021 0.7979 1.846 0.201 0.799 
2 1.8513 0.237 0.763 1.852 0.2381 0.7619 
 
 
Panel C: White test for heteroscedasticity of OLS residues 
 
 CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Index SP500 Index 
 
2  P value 2   P value 
Event 1 0.05 0.9750 0.06 0.9682 
Event 2 0.74 0.691 0.76 0.6825 
 
 
7.0  Summary And Conclusions 
 
The question of whether the provision of non-audit services by the external auditor impacts investor 
perceptions about auditor independence and thus perceptions about financial statement reliability is a critical issue to 
the financial markets and the overall economy. The SEC, concerned over the rapid growth of non-audit services by 
external auditors enacted Rule S7-13-00 that requires a proxy statement disclosing the total fees paid to the external 
auditor.  
Using a sample of 115 large U.S. firms, we tested the proposition that the non-audit fee disclosures have no 
significant effect on their stock prices. The impact on firm value was specifically tested against two important events 
in the Enron debacle. The first event was the initial announcement of the accounting irregularities at Enron that 
resulted in a  $1.2 billion dollars equity write-off. The second event involved the announcement that Enron‟s 
auditor-Arthur Andersen-was being investigated by the SEC.  
 
The results suggest the presence of significantly negative abnormal returns for event 1. Moreover, the 
extent to which the firms in the sample used non-audit services from its external auditor (a proxy for auditor 
independence) is negatively and significantly related to the abnormal returns for the event announcing the 
accounting irregularities at Enron. These results are consistent with the argument that non-audit services are 
detrimental to auditor independence and financial statement reliability perceptions. The relationship between auditor 
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independence and abnormal returns under the announcement of the SEC investigation of Andersen are less robust 
and not significant. We argue that this announcement is viewed as “old” news for investors and that they have 
already priced the auditor independence effect during the initial announcement of accounting irregularities at Enron.  
 
In summary, the results of the study suggest that auditor independence and therefore financial statement 
reliability are compromised by the provision of non-audit services by the external auditor. The results also indicate 
that in the wake of the Enron revelations, investors perceive financial statements as being less reliable thus require a 
additional risk premium, which translates into lower stock prices and a loss of firm value.    
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Endnote 
 
i
  During estimation of equation (5), we tested for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the cross-sectional OLS 
residues. First, we use the generalized Durbin-Watson statistics to test for first- and second-order autocorrelation, 
then we use the White test to identify the heteroscedasticity. We also calculate the Eicker-White heteroscedasticity-
consistent variance and covariance from OLS estimation to get the heteroscedasticity-adjusted t statistic for the 
estimated coefficients.  
 
